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Abstract
Is the Swedish central government a wage leader? This question is studied
empirically in a vector error-correction model using a unique, high quality data
set. Private sector salaries are found to be weakly exogenous to the system
of equations. This means that the private sector is the wage leader in the
long-run model. We also ﬁnd that salaries in these two sectors do not converge
to a common salary in the long-run and that changes in central government
salaries do not Granger cause changes in private sector salaries. Together, these
ﬁndings clearly demonstrate that the central government is not placing undue
pressure on salaries in the private sector. The central government is not acting
as a wage leader.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Scandinavian countries have small, open economies. Their labor forces are
highly unionized and they tend to have relatively large public sectors. This par-
ticular combination of characteristics creates a unique set of challenges to the wage
formation process. The main challenge is how to set wages in the highly union-
ized, non-competitive sectors without placing undue pressure on the wage formation
process in the competitive sectors, pressure that would ultimately put these sectors
at a signiﬁcant disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign competitors, particularly when
exchange rates are ﬁxed.1
This problem has been widely recognized by politicians and trade union econo-
mists alike and was formalized in a number of economic models during the early
1970’s. The Norwegian multi-sector price income model (Aukrust, 1970, 1977), the
Swedish EFO-model (Edgren, Faxén and Odhner, 1973), and Finland’s input-output
framework (Halttunen and Molander, 1972) all address this problem explicitly. Col-
lectively, these models are known as the Scandinavian model of inﬂation. The two
main tenants of the Scandinavian model are; ﬁrst, nominal wage changes in the com-
petitive sector should be equal to the sum of productivity changes in the that sector
plus changes in world prices and, second, that the competitive sector should act as the
wage leader (i.e. wage increases should be transmitted from the competitive sector
to the protected sector and not vice-versa).2
In Sweden, the EFO-model has been used by a number of economists to evaluate
the wage formation process ex post (see e.g. Jacobson and Ohlsson, 1994 and Friberg,
2003). More importantly, it has acted as a set of normative guidelines for employers
1If exchange rates are ﬂexible, then upward pressure on wages in the competitive sector may result
in currency depreciations. These automatic depreciations will increase exchange rate volatility. One
could argue that there may be costs to doing business with a volatile exchange rate. Furthermore,
total consumer welfare may go down by more than total producer welfare goes up when the exchange
rate falls.
2Wage leadership can also be derived from institutional, wage bargaining models and eﬃciency
wage models (see e.g. Bemmels and Zaidi, 1990).
2and trade union negotiators, even after Sweden abandoned its ﬁxed exchange rate
regime. The normative conclusions of the EFO-model have been oﬃcially adopted
by the Swedish Agency for Government Employers (Arbetsgivarverket) and guides
their wage setting policies (Elvander, 2004; Lindquist and Vilhelmsson, 2004). The
purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not actual wage outcomes of central
government employees are in line with this stated praxis.3
We begin by presenting several institutional facts which may be relevant to the
question at hand. First of all, central government wage agreements have, as a rule,
been completed after wage agreements in the private sector have been signed (Holm-
lund and Ohlsson, 1992; Friberg, 2003; Elvander, 2004). Second, according to the
Framework Appropriations System (Ramanslagssystemet) adopted in 1994, central
government salaries are supposed to be explicitly tied to wage bill increases (net of
average productivity growth) in the competitive sector. Third, the average salary of
a central government worker is lower than that of a white-collar worker in the pri-
vate sector (see Figure 1). Fourth, in 2002, the central government employed only 6
percent of all workers, while local government employed 28.5 percent and the private
sector employed the remaining 65.5 percent.4 Together, these facts makes it less likely
that the central government has been acting as a wage leader.5
A number of earlier studies concluded that the private sector was, in fact, the
wage leader in Sweden (Holmlund and Ohlsson, 1992; Jacobson and Ohlsson, 1994;
Andersson and Isaksson, 1997). This result is in line with the EFO-model and con-
sistent with the stated goal of the Swedish Agency for Government Employers. How-
3It is not our goal in this paper to analyze the validity of the normative conclusions drawn from
the EFO-model. These are taken as praxis. Our goal is to put this praxis to a rigorous statistical
test.
4Central government employment peaked at 11.5 percent in 1979. Since then, it has been dropping
steadily due to the privatization of a number of state owned companies, to the separation between
church and state, and to the transfer of grade school and high school teachers from the central
government to the local government. Source: Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån).
5See Lindquist and Vilhelmsson (2004) for a more thorough description of the relevant wage
setting institutions as well as a short history of their development.
3ever, several new reports published by the Swedish Central Bank (Tägtström, 2000;
Friberg, 2003) have argued that the Swedish central government is now acting as a
wage leader (at least for parts of the private sector). Our paper challenges these
results and re-establishes the fact that there is no wage push coming from the central
government.6
This is done using a unique, high quality data set, which is presented in Section 2.
Unlike the previous studies by Holmlund and Ohlsson (1992), Jacobson and Ohlsson
(1994), Tägtström (2000) and Friberg (2003), we do not compare the salaries of
central government employees with the salaries of all workers in the private sector
(i.e. an aggregate of blue-collar and white collar workers). Instead, we compare them
to white collar salaries alone. We believe this to be the proper comparison, since
more than 95 percent of all central government employees are white-collar workers
(Lindquist and Vilhelmsson, 2004). Central government employees are members of
white-collar unions and are, therefore, covered by white-collar contracts (Lindquist
and Vilhelmsson, 2004). If the central government is putting undue pressure on the
labor market, this eﬀect should be most noticeable in the market for white-collar
workers.7
The empirical results of this paper are presented in Section 3. They are based
on the estimation of a vector error-correction model using the Johansen maximum
likelihood approach (see e.g. Johansen, 1995). The methods used in this paper are
similar to those used by Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994).8
We have three primary results. First, private sector salaries are found to be weakly
6Mizala and Romaguera (1995) test for public sector wage leadership in Chile. They ﬁnd that
after the deregulation of the Chilean labor market (between 1979-1982), the public sector lost its
wage leading position.
7Andersson and Isaksson (1997) also make this distinction between white-collar and blue-collar
workers, but there data set only goes up to 1995. Our updated data set allows us to consider the
impact of the new Framework Appropriations System implemented in 1994 as well as the full impact
of the move towards individual wage setting stipulated by the Framework Agreement (Ramavtal)
which was put into place in 1990.
8O u ri m p r e s s i o ni st h a tJ a c o b s o na n dO h l s s o n( 1 9 9 4 )w e r et h eﬁrst to apply the Johansen method-
ology in a stringent manner to construct a serious test of the EFO-model.
4exogenous to the system of equations. This means that the private sector is the wage
leader in the long-run model. Central government salaries adjust to changes in private
sector salaries in order to maintain the long-run equilibrium relationship. Second,
changes in central government salaries do not Granger cause changes in private sector
salaries. Changes in private sector salaries are determined by a deterministic trend
(domestic inﬂation) and a stochastic trend (which we interpret in line with the EFO-
model as the sum of changes in exogenous productivity and changes in exogenous
world prices). Third, we ﬁnd that salaries in these two sectors do not converge
to a common salary in the long-run. Together, these ﬁndings tell us that actual
wage bargaining outcomes for central government workers are in line with the stated
intentions of the Swedish Agency for Government Employers and that they are not
placing undue pressure on the private sector market for white-collar workers.9
2D a t a
We use two data series in this study: nominal monthly, white-collar salaries in the
private sector, w
ps
t , and nominal monthly salaries in the central government, w
cg
t
(see Figure 1). The data are annual time series from 1970 to 2002 collected by the
9We believe that the results presented in Tägtström (2000) and Friberg (2003) are the product
of unfortunate choices of methods and data. Tägtström applies a standard Granger causality test
to nonstationary data. These tests are (at best) only approximately correct and demand the use
of non-standard F-test statistics. They may not be valid at all (Charemza and Deadman, 1992).
Furthermore, when she tests for Granger causality using the data in ﬁrst diﬀerences (i.e. using
stationary data) these new, more correct tests show that the central government is not a wage
leader.
Friberg (2003), on the other hand, uses methods similar to those employed in this paper and in
Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994). The main methodological shortcomings of his paper is that he does
not perform joint tests of cointegration and model speciﬁcation, nor does he consider the impact of
including deterministic components on the distribution of his test statistics. Given the large number
of alternative models that he presents (and an equally large number that he fails to address), the fact
that he does not test for model speciﬁcation means that he does not reject a number of misspeciﬁed
models nor does he necessarily ﬁnd the most appropriate model. At the end of the day, our inability
to distinguish between alternative models makes his results unambiguous and diﬃcult to use in
practice. The Granger causality tests in his paper are also incomplete. They examine the impact of
x on z, but ignore the impact that x might have on z through a third variable y.
5Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Svenskt Näringsliv) and the Swedish Agency
for Government Employers. They are based on actual contracts and cover nearly all
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Figure 1: Salaries of White-Collar Workers, 1970-2002.
There are three major advantages of using this data, as compared to the data
used in earlier studies. First, and most importantly, since more than 95 percent of
all central government workers are white-collar workers, and since these workers are
covered by white-collar unions, negotiations and contracts, it seems only reasonable
to examine the impact of central government wage formation on wages of white-collar
workers in the private sector. Comparing central government wages to an aggregate of
white-collar and blue-collar workers in the private sector may be grossly misleading.
Second, the wage data used in this study have been correctly periodicized. For
example, retroactive wages have been book-kept as yesterday’s wages, whereas in
the wage data from Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån) they are treated as
today’s wages. This type of periodicization is made possible by the fact that the data
comes from employers with more precise knowledge about contracts and actual wages
paid out.
Third, the two time series have been cleansed of between sector wage changes
6due to structural changes. This is necessary because a number of large government
companies have been privatized during this time period, including; the postal service,
the telephone company, the largest energy producer, the railroad track maintenance
company, and even the Swedish Lutheran church. Such changes in the underlying
structure of the two sectors have been controlled for when producing the time series.
Another important example is that primary and secondary school teachers are no
longer central government employees. This has also been controlled for.
2.1 Pre-Testing the Data
Examining the time series for private sector, white-collar salaries and central govern-
ment salaries in Figure 1, we see that both variables are clearly nonstationary. When
this is the case, it is important to investigate the nature of this nonstationarity. To
do this, we pre-test each variable in order to determine its order of integration (i.e.
the presence of one or more unit roots) and to test for the presence of deterministic
trends. This is done using the augmented Dickey-Fuller sequential procedure outlined
in Enders (2004). The details of these tests can be seen in Appendix A.
The results of this sequential testing procedure are unambiguous. Both variables
have a single unit root and are, hence, integrated of order one. Each of the variables
also contains a quadratic deterministic trend which is due to the high level of inﬂation
in Sweden during the 1970’s and ’80’s. The fact that both variables are I(1) means
that they are potentially cointegrated. A joint test for cointegration and the presence
o faq u a d r a t i ct r e n di nt h ep r e f e r r e dm o d e lw i l lb ec a r r i e do u tb e l o w . T h er e s u l t s
from this test tell us that we can, in fact, use regression analysis to say something
meaningful about the relationship between these two variables despite the fact that
they are both nonstationary and include stochastic trends.
73 Estimating a Vector Error-Correction Model
The empirical results of this paper are based on the estimation of a vector error-
correction (VEC) model using the Johansen maximum likelihood approach (see e.g.
Johansen, 1995). The VEC modelling strategy allows us to test for wage leadership in
two distinct ways. First, we can examine if one of the variables included in the model
is, in fact, weakly exogenous to the estimated system of equations. If two variables,
Xt and Yt, are cointegrated, and if the variable Xt turns out to be weakly exogenous,
while the variable Yt is not, then we know that the variable Yt adjusts to changes in
the variable Xt in order to maintain the long-run equilibrium. In this case, Xt is the
"leader" and Yt is the "follower". Second, the model allows us to construct a more
robust test of Granger causality between ∆Xt and ∆Yt.10 One which does not suﬀer
from the exclusion of a very important variable, namely, the long-run cointegrating
relationship between Xt and Yt.
We will also take advantage of the fact that a VEC model allows us to model
both the short- and long-run relationship between white-collar salaries in theses two
sectors. This allows us to test for the presence of salary convergence in the long-run
and to examine the determinants of salary formation in the short-run.
3.1 Determining the Lag Length
The ﬁrst step in building a well speciﬁed, vector error-correction model is to determine
the number of lags, p, which should be included in the model. This is done by
estimating an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR) model using the data
10∆x denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence of variable x.
8in levels.11 The VAR(p) model can be written as
xt = µ + A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + ... + Apxt−p + εt (1)





0, µ is a (2 × 1) vector with potentially nonzero constants. Each
A is a (2 × 2) matrix of regression coeﬃcients and εt is a (2 × 1) vector of Gaussian,
white noise error terms. This VAR(p) system of equations can be viewed as a model in
reduced form. When determining the lag length p our goal is to obtain a parsimonious
representation of the model which, at the same time, includes a suﬃcient number of
lagged xts so as to glean out all information available from the εtsc o n c e r n i n gt h e
structure of the relationship between the xts. This means that our choice of p should
be as minimal as possible, while, at the same time, we cannot allow non-normality,
serial autocorrelation, or ARCH to appear in the residuals.
Following Enders (2004) we use multivariate generalizations of the Akaike in-
formation criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to choose the
appropriate lag length, p. The principle behind these two tests is the same. We are
punished for adding variables that do not contribute signiﬁcantly to the model ﬁt.
Oftentimes, these two test result in conﬂicting conclusion. But here they do not.
Both the AIC and BIC choose p =1to be the appropriate lag length. This ﬁnd-
ing is conﬁrmed by a set of likelihood ratio tests (Sims, 1980) which tell us that a
VAR(p>1) model does not signiﬁcantly outperform the VAR(1) model. The results
11Since only lagged values of the endogenous variables appear on the right-hand side of each
equation, there is no issue of simultaneity. Furthermore, the VAR model is "balanced". That is, the
same regressors appear in each equation. Thus, OLS is an appropriate estimation technique. It can
be applied to each equation in the system separately.
9of these tests are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Determining the lag length, p.
p AIC BIC LR-test statistic χ2 (4(p − 1))-value (5%)
1 26.85 27.12
2 26.93 27.39 2.43 9.49
3 27.20 27.85 2.64 15.51
4 27.37 28.21 3.63 21.03
5 27.73 28.78 3.22 26.30
Unfortunately, the residuals in the second equation of the VAR(1) model (i.e. the
equation with central government salaries as the dependent variable) are not normally
distributed. The Jarque-Bera test for normality has a p-value of 0.003. This implies
that there is more information about the structure of the relationship in the data
which we have not yet extracted from the residuals.
We continue by estimating a VAR(2) model. The residuals from this model are
normally distributed, they do not suﬀer from serial autocorrelation nor do we detect
t h ep r e s e n c eo fA R C H .T h u s ,w ea c c e p tp =2as the lag length in our VAR model.
Table 2 shows that the AIC, BIC, and LR-tests all choose a VAR(2) model as the
appropriate model given that we cannot accept a VAR(1) model due to non-normality
of the residuals. With p =2in hand we can write down the unrestricted VAR(2)
model as
xt = µ + A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + εt. (2)
10Table 2: Determination of lag-order, p.
p AIC BIC LR-test statistic χ2 (4(p − 2))-value (5%)
2 26.93 27.39
3 27.20 27.85 0.66 9.49
4 27.37 28.21 2.09 15.51
5 27.73 28.78 2.04 21.03
3 . 2 AJ o i n tT e s tf o rC o i n t e g r a t i o na n dM o d e lS p e c i ﬁcation
The VAR(2) model can be rewritten in error-correction form as a VEC(1) model
∆xt = µ + πxt−1 + π1∆xt−1 + εt. (3)
Testing for cointegration between the nonstationary variables, x, amounts to deter-
mining the rank of the matrix π. If the rank of π is zero, then there are no linearly
independent combinations of the nonstationary variables which are stationary. Thus,
the nonstationary variables are not cointegrated. If the rank of π is two, then the
variables themselves are both stationary (and the test for cointegration becomes re-
dundant). If the rank of π is one, then there is one linearly independent combination
of the nonstationary variables which is stationary. This means that the nonstationary
variables are cointegrated. Thus, we want to test the hypothesis that rank(π)=1 .
The Johansen method requires that we determine the rank of π and test for the
presence of deterministic components in the model jointly, since the presence of deter-
ministic components in the model aﬀects the properties of the test for cointegration.
To make these notions more clear, let us start by examining a more general version
11of the VEC(1) model
∆xt = µsr + δsrt + e πe xt−1 + π1∆xt−1 + εt














































+ π1∆xt−1 + εt (4)
where µsr is a (2 × 1) vector of constants in the short-run model, δsr is a (2 × 1)
vector of regression coeﬃcients which allow for a deterministic time trend, t,i nt h e
short-run model. The matrix π and the vector of variables xt−1 are both modiﬁed to
allow for the presence of a single constant, µlr, and a single deterministic time trend,
δlrt, in the long-run model (i.e. in the cointegrating vector). These are denoted as
e π and e xt−1, respectively. The matrix e π can be factored into a (2 × 1) vector, α,
which represents the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium and a (1 × 4)
vector β =
£
βps βcg µlr δlr
¤
that represents the long-run (equilibrium) cointegrating
vector. This general VEC(1) model encompasses 5 distinct models:
model 1: H0 : µsr = µlr = δsrt = δlrt =0
model 2: H0 : µsr = δsrt = δlrt =0
model 3: H0 : µlr = δsrt = δlrt =0
model 4: H0 : δsrt =0
model 5: H0 : no restrictions on the deterministic components.
O u rt a s ki st oi d e n t i f yw h i c ho ft h e s em o d e l sﬁts the data best at the same time
as we test for cointegration. We can do this by testing diﬀerent sets of restrictions
jointly with the restriction that the rank of e π is either 0, 1, or 2. We can minimize on
12the number of tests necessary to complete this task by realizing that neither Model 1
or Model 2 are reasonable representation of the data, since the data trends upwards
over time. This trend can be captured in model 3 by allowing for a non-zero drift
term in each equation, µsr. Models 4 and 5 are also reasonable representations of the
data. Model 5, however, is the only model which explicitly allows for a quadratic,
deterministic trend in the data, which is what we found when we pre-tested the
variables. We can also exclude the test for rank(e π)=2 , since both variables are
I (1).
This leaves us with a set of 6 joint null hypotheses to be tested. These null
hypotheses can be ordered from the most restrictive test to the least restrictive test
as follows: model 3 ∩ rank(e π)=0 ;model 4 ∩ rank(e π)=0 ;model 5 ∩ rank(e π)=0;
model 3 ∩ rank(e π)=1 ;model 4 ∩ rank(e π)=1 ;model 5 ∩ rank(e π)=1 .T a b l e 3
shows each of these null hypotheses along with the appropriate likelihood-ratio (trace)
test.
Table 3: Joint Determination of Rank(e π) and Deterministic Components.
H0 : Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
rank(e π) LR-stat 5% LR-stat 5% LR-stat 5%
0 19.44∗ 15.41 27.84∗ 25.32 18.81∗ 18.17
1 5.46∗ 3.76 10.49 12.25 1.47 3.74
* denotes rejection of H0 at 5% signiﬁcance level.
Critical values taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Four of the six null hypotheses are rejected at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
Although H0:m o d e l4∩ rank(e π) = 1 is not rejected by the likelihood-ratio test, the
residuals from this model trend upwards. As we saw in the pre-tests of the variables,
there is a deterministic trend in ∆xt. Model 4 restricts this trend to be zero and,
hence, the trend in ∆xt shows up in the residuals.
H0:m o d e l5∩ rank(e π) = 1 is not rejected. The residuals from this model are
13normally distributed, not serial autocorrelated, nor do they suﬀer from ARCH. The
AIC and BIC also choose model 5 over model 4. Thus, model 5 is our preferred
model.
The rank of the estimated e π matrix, b π, is equal to one which means that the
long-run model e πe xt−1 is indeed cointegrated. The dual of this result is that there is
one common stochastic trend driving the long run model. This stochastic trend is
often assumed to be the sum of exogenous domestic productivity and exogenous world
market prices (see e.g. Jacobson and Ohlsson, 1994). The quadratic, deterministic
trend can be interpreted as domestic inﬂation, where the quadratic part is due to the
high level of inﬂation in Sweden during the 1970’s and ’80’s.
3.3 Testing Structural Hypotheses
I nt h i ss e c t i o no ft h ep a p e r ,w ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt e s t i n gt w oh y p o t h e s e s .F i r s t ,a n d
most importantly, does the central government act as a wage leader? Second, do
white-collar salaries in diﬀerent sectors converge over time to a common salary?
These two structural hypotheses can be formulated as restrictions on the VEC(1)
model and then tested. To do this, we factor the (2 × 4) matrix b π into a (2 × 1)
vector, b α,a n da(4 × 1) vector, b β, such that b π = b αb β
0
.T h eﬁrst vector, b α =[ b αps b αcg],
which is often referred to as the "loading" matrix, is a pair of weights concerning the
importance of the long run relationship (cointegrating vector) in explaining changes





0.T h e c o e ﬃcients in b α measure the speed of adjustment to past
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, is the cointegrating






The estimated values of b α and b β are reported in Table 4. The values of b β have
been normalized with b βps. The standard errors of those coeﬃcients in b β that are
not uniquely identiﬁed are not reported. Testing structural hypotheses amounts to
14testing restrictions on b α and b β.12
Table 4: Estimates of b α and b β.
b βps b βcg b µlr b δlr b αps b αcg
1 -1.17 50.6 66.3 -0.013 0.769
(0.039)
a (0.292) (0.260)
a) Standard errors in parentheses.
3.3.1 Testing for Wage Leadership in the Long-Run Model
Testing for wage leadership in the long-run model amounts to testing each variable for
weak exogeneity. The existence of only one cointegrating vector simpliﬁes this test:
we need only examine the t-values associated with b αps and b αcg. These are -0.044 and
2.96, respectively. Since we cannot reject H0 : αps =0 , we conclude that w
ps
t is
weakly exogenous to the system of equations. Central government salaries, w
cg
t ,o n
the other hand, are endogenous to the system of equations, since we can clearly reject
H0 : αcg =0 .
The null hypothesis that the central government acts as a wage leader (H0 : b αps 6=
0 ∩ b αcg = 0) is strongly rejected . On the other hand, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the private sector is the wage leader (H0 : b αps =0∩ b αcg 6=0 ) .T h et e s tf o rw e a k
exogeneity shows us that adjustments to the long run equilibrium are made through
adjustments to central government salaries. That is, central government salaries react
to changes in private sector salaries. They (alone) uphold the long-run relationship
between the two sectors. In fact, b αcg = 0.769 tells us that the central government
corrects 77 percent of the equilibrium error within one year’s time. Together, these
tests tell us unambiguously that the private sector is the wage leader and the central
government is the wage follower.
12As we shall see, this can be done without ﬁrst identifying (uniquely) all of the coeﬃcients in b β.
153.3.2 Testing for Wage Leadership in the Short-Run Model
Given that w
ps
t is weakly exogenous to the system of equations, we can factorize the
model into two single equations: one marginal model of ∆w
ps
t and one conditional
model for ∆w
cg
t .13 We can use the marginal model of ∆w
ps
t to test whether or not
∆w
cg
t Granger causes ∆w
ps
t . This can be viewed as a test for wage leadership in the
short-run model.
Estimating the marginal model of ∆w
ps
t results in the following regression equation
∆w
ps















An F-test concerning the hypothesis that the two coeﬃcients in π1are equal to zero
has a p-value of 0.58. So, we can pare down the marginal model to
∆w
ps







which has an R
2
= 0.54. The residuals are normally distributed and do not suﬀer from
serial autocorrelation or ARCH. Thus we can conclude that ∆w
cg
t does not Granger
cause ∆w
ps
t . Changes in private sector salaries are determined by a deterministic
trend (domestic inﬂation) and by a stochastic trend (domestic productivity + world
market prices) and not by changes in central government salaries.
3.3.3 Testing for Wage Equalization
Testing for long-run convergence in salary levels between sectors amounts to a test
for homogeneity. A test for salary convergence can be formulated as, H0 : b βps =1 ∩
b βcg = −1 (where both coeﬃcients are ﬁrst normalized by b βps). The alternative
hypothesis is formulated as; HA : b βcg 6= −1.
Since w
ps
t is weakly exogenous to the system of equations, we can carry out this
13This also means that we can estimate each equation separately using OLS.
16test by estimating a single equation for ∆w
cg
t . Estimating the conditional model of
∆w
cg
t results in the following regression equation
∆w
cg
















































which has an R
2
= 0.55. The residuals are normally distributed and do not suﬀer from
serial autocorrelation or ARCH. The normalized, long-run relationship (cointegrating
vector) is given by [1 -1.25 241 84.8].14 The speed of adjustment parameter, b α,i sn o w
equal to 0.75.
The null hypothesis of the homogeneity test is H0 : b βcg/b βps = −1.T h eW a l dt e s t
statistic for this restriction has a p-value of 0.00. We must, therefore, reject the null
hypothesis of wage homogeneity. Salaries in the two sectors do not converge over
time. This can also be seen in ﬁgure 2 which shows a simple plot of the ratio of





4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper clearly shows that there is no wage push coming from the central govern-
ment. The central government is not acting as a wage leader. This result reaﬃrms
previous ﬁndings by Holmlund and Ohlsson (1992) and Jacobson and Ohlsson (1994),
but stands in stark contrast to two recent papers published by the Swedish Central
14The estimates of the constant and the linear trend are actually conglomerate estimates of the
constants and trends in both the short-run and the long-run conditional model.
15It is important to keep in mind, however, that the data has in no way been cleansed of potential
























Figure 2: Ratio of Privates Sector Salaries to Central Government salaries.
Bank (Tägtsröm, 2000 and Friberg, 2003). This paper also ﬁnds that the salaries of
white-collar workers in the private sector and central government show no tendency
to converge to a common salary in the long run. Together, these ﬁndings tell us that
actual wage bargaining outcomes for central government workers are in line with the
stated intentions of the Swedish Agency for Government Employers and that they
are not placing undue pressure on the private sector market for white-collar workers.
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A Pre-Testing the Data




t are subjected to a series of tests to
determine their order of integration and to test for the presence of deterministic
trends. This is done using the augmented Dickey-Fuller sequential procedure as




1. Run a Dickey-Fuller regression for the variable w
ps













The Q-statistics tell us that there is no serial correlation in et.H e n c e , t h e
DF-test is a valid regression.
(a) H0:C o e ﬃcient on w
ps
t−1 =0→ unit root.
(b) HA:C o e ﬃcient on w
ps
t−1 < 0 → no unit root.
i. Test statistic = -0.05/0.038 = -1.34.
ii. MacKinnon critical value = -3.21 (10% level).
(c) Test result = we cannot reject the presence of a unit root.
2. Test for the presence of the trend.
(a) H0:C o e ﬃcients on w
ps
t−1 = t =0 .
(b) HA:C o e ﬃcients on w
ps
t−1 =0and t 6=0 .
i. F-test using φ3 test statistic (Enders, 2004, p. 440)
ii. F-statistic = 20.06
iii. Critical value = 10.61 (1% signiﬁcance level).
(c) Test result = reject H0.
3. Test for unit root using normal distribution.
20(a) H0 : Coeﬃcient on w
ps
t−1 =0 .
(b) H1 : Coeﬃcient on w
ps
t−1 < 0.
i. t-value = -1.34
ii. We cannot reject H0.
4. Test results = w
ps
t contains both a stochastic trend and a deterministic trend.
5. Test for a second unit root.
6. Run a Dickey-Fuller regression for the variable ∆w
ps













The Q-statistics tells us that there is no serial correlation in et.H e n c e , t h e
DF-test is valid.
(a) H0:C o e ﬃcient on ∆w
ps
t−1 =0→ second unit root.
(b) H1:C o e ﬃcient on ∆w
ps
t−1 < 0 → no second unit root.
i. Test statistic = -0.86/0.186 = -4.61.
ii. MacKinnon critical value = -4.28 (1% level).
(c) Test result = we can reject the presence of a second unit root.
7. Is the coeﬃcient on t signiﬁcant? Yes → quadratic trend.
8. We conclude that w
ps





1. Run a Dickey-Fuller regression for the variable w
cg













The Q-statistics tell us that there is no serial correlation in et.H e n c e , t h e
DF-test is valid.
(a) H0:C o e ﬃcient on w
cg
t−1 =0→ unit root.
(b) HA:C o e ﬃcient on w
cg
t−1 < 0 → no unit root.
i. Test statistic = -0.084/0.043 = -1.94.
ii. MacKinnon critical value = -3.21 (10% level).
(c) Test result = we cannot reject the presence of a unit root.
212. Test for the presence of the trend.
(a) H0:C o e ﬃcients on w
cg
t−1 = t =0 .
(b) HA:C o e ﬃcients on w
cg
t−1 =0and t 6=0 .
i. F-test using φ3 test statistic (Enders, 2004, p. 440).
ii. F-statistic = 15.36
iii. Critical value = 10.61 (1% signiﬁcance level).
iv. Test result = reject H0.
3. Test for unit root using normal distribution.
(a) H0 : Coeﬃcient on w
cg
t−1 =0 .
(b) HA : Coeﬃcient on w
cg
t−1 < 0.
i. t-value = -1.94.
ii. We cannot reject H0 at 5% signiﬁcance levels (p-value = 0.062).
4. Test results = w
cg
t contains both a stochastic trend and a deterministic trend.
5. Test for a second unit root.
6. Run a Dickey-Fuller regression for the variable ∆w
cg













The Q-statistics tells us that there is no serial correlation in et.H e n c e , t h e
DF-test is valid.
(a) H0:C o e ﬃcient on ∆w
cg
t−1 =0→ unit root.
(b) HA:C o e ﬃcient on ∆w
cg
t−1 < 0 → no unit root.
i. Test statistic = -0.78/0.184 = -4.23.
ii. MacKinnon critical value = -4.28 (1% level)
(c) Test result = we can reject the presence of a unit root in ∆∆w
cg
t .
7. Is the coeﬃcient on t signiﬁcant? Yes → quadratic trend.
8. We conclude that w
cg
t is an I(1) variable. It also contains a quadratic, deter-
ministic trend.
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